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Investor Behavior and the Benefits of Direct Stock Ownership 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Using an experiment to rule out reverse causality, we examine whether a small investment in a 
company’s stock leads investors to purchase more of the company’s products and adopt other 
views and preferences that benefit the company. We pre-register our research methods, 
hypotheses, and supplemental analyses via the Journal of Accounting Research’s registration 
based editorial process. We find little evidence consistent with these hypotheses for the average 
investor in our sample using our planned univariate hypothesis tests, and planned Bayesian 
parameter estimation shows substantial downward belief revision for more optimistic ex ante 
expectations of the treatment effects. In planned supplemental analyses, however, we do find that 
the effects of ownership on product purchase behavior and on regulatory preferences are 
intuitively stronger for certain subgroups of investors—namely, for investors who are most likely 
to purchase the types of products offered by the company and for investors who are most likely 
to vote on political matters. The results contribute to our understanding of the benefits of direct 
stock ownership and are informative to public company managers and directors. 
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1. Introduction 
 Theory and empirical work consider a variety of benefits of stock ownership by financial 
intermediaries such as pension funds and banks for dimensions of firms’ operating performance 
(e.g., Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks [2005], Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales [2013], Chen, 
Harford, and Li [2007]). In contrast, relatively few papers examine the benefits of direct, 
individual ownership on operating performance. In this study, which was pre-registered via the 
Journal of Accounting Research’s registration based editorial process, we predict that even small 
amounts of stock ownership can change individual investors’ behaviors in ways that benefit the 
firm. In particular, we predict that stock ownership leads investors to purchase more of the firm’s 
products and adopt other views and preferences that benefit the firm. We further expect these 
effects are not limited to the investors themselves; i.e., we expect investors’ altered behavior to 
spread within social networks to influence the behavior of friends, family, and colleagues. 
Although our primary focus is on product and regulatory preferences that could positively affect 
the firm’s operating performance, we also provide evidence on other potential capital market 
benefits associated with direct stock ownership—e.g., the effects on investors’ earnings 
expectations and assessments of financial reporting and earnings quality.  
 A key challenge to identify the effect of stock ownership on individual investor behaviors 
is to rule out reverse causality. For example, the few prior papers that examine the effect of stock 
ownership on product preferences (including the propensity for repeat patronage and other 
brand-loyal behaviors) rely on survey evidence from Nordic countries (Aspara [2009], Aspara, 
Nyman, and Tikkanen [2008]). Although these papers find an association between stock 
ownership and current product preferences or future purchase intentions, prior literature also 
provides consistent evidence that investors follow the popular investment mantra to “buy what 
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you know” (Aspara and Tikkanen [2011], Frieder and Subrahmanyam [2005], Keloharju, 
Knüpfer, and Linnainmaa [2012], MacGregor, Slovic, Dreman, and Berry [2000], 
Schoenbachler, Gordon, and Aurand [2004]), which suggests that purchase behavior and beliefs 
about a company also influence the choice to invest. In contrast to prior archival and survey 
evidence, we address the reverse causality confound by generating data using an experiment in 
which investors are randomly assigned stock ownership. After several months, we collect data on 
actual purchase behavior and on a number of investors’ other views and preferences.1  
Graduate business students enrolled in introductory financial accounting classes at three 
universities form our sample of individual investors. We conduct the experiment at multiple 
universities to obtain a large sample of participants and to address certain alternative 
explanations for the results, as discussed further below. At the beginning of the academic term, 
students are told that if they opt in they will be given a $20 investment in a publicly traded 
company, and in exchange for their participation they will receive the market value of their stock 
as of a pre-specified date in the following academic term. Upon opting into the study, 
participants are randomly assigned ownership in either Starbucks Corporation or one of three 
control companies. Participants learn the names of all companies included in the experiment to 
ensure any unintentional endorsement of each company is constant across conditions.2 Figure 1 
illustrates the timing of the experiment. 
< FIGURE 1 >                                                         
1 Prior papers that study the association between stock ownership and product preferences typically do not collect 
data on actual purchases. One exception to this is Keloharju et al. (2012), who examine evidence from Finland that 
gifts or inheritances of stock in brokerage companies are associated with subsequent patronage of those companies. 
The implicit assumption of these tests is that inheritances and gifts of stock are not associated with the recipient’s ex 
ante product preferences or purchase intentions and are not viewed as an implicit recommendation by the donor. 
They find mixed evidence: gifts, but not inheritances, have a statistically significant association with subsequent 
patronage.  
2 Altogether, participants receive an investment in one of four companies—Starbucks Corporation, Microsoft 
Corporation, Procter & Gamble Company, or 3M Company. Roughly half of the participants at each university 
receive an investment in Starbucks; all other participants receive an investment in one of the other three companies. 
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We collect data using an in-class poll and an online survey. The in-class poll occurs 
during the academic term and examines whether stock ownership differentially affects 
participants’ stated preference for Starbucks products to be served at a business school event—
i.e., participants’ use of others’ money to purchase Starbucks products. We distribute the online 
survey at the end of the academic term. Within this survey, participants indicate how likely it is 
they would vote for a possible regulatory action that would negatively affect Starbucks’ financial 
performance and use credit and debit card statements and their Starbucks Rewards Account (if 
applicable) to provide information on their Starbucks product purchases since receiving the 
investment. Participants also answer a variety of questions throughout the survey to inform 
potential mechanisms through which stock ownership could affect product and regulatory 
preferences and to inform potential moderating variables.  
A total of 269 participants provide data for the study. In our planned hypothesis tests, we 
do not find statistically significant evidence that, relative to the average control company 
investor, the average Starbucks investor in our sample spends more of her own money on 
Starbucks products, indicates more interest in having Starbucks products served at a business 
school event, or expresses regulatory views more closely aligned with Starbucks’ financial 
interests. These null findings are not sensitive to a number of reasonable adjustments to the data 
or design of the analyses, and Bayesian parameter estimation shows substantial downward belief 
revision for more optimistic ex ante expectations of the average effects of stock ownership on the 
dependent variables. However, certain individuals are likely to be more susceptible to the 
hypothesized treatment effects than others. For instance, individuals who do not already buy the 
types of products sold at Starbucks are unlikely to change their purchase habits dramatically due 
to stock ownership. Similarly, individuals who are not engaged in political and regulatory 
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matters are unlikely to begin forming stronger opinions due to stock ownership. Consistent with 
these arguments, planned cross-sectional analyses show that the effects of Starbucks ownership 
on product purchases and on regulatory preferences are intuitively stronger for certain subgroups 
of participants. Specifically, we find that the effect of ownership on purchase behavior is greater 
for participants who report purchasing more coffee- and tea-related beverages, and that the effect 
of ownership on regulatory preferences is stronger for subgroups that are more likely to vote on 
US political and regulatory matters—namely, older participants and participants who are US 
Nationals. In other planned supplemental analysis, we find that relative to control company 
investors, Starbucks investors report experiencing greater discomfort voting for political 
measures that would undermine Starbucks’ financial performance, suggesting that ownership has 
at least a marginal effect on cognitions about regulation. 
Few of the remaining planned supplemental analyses yield statistically significant 
differences between Starbucks investors and control company investors. For example, we find no 
evidence that closer social connections to Starbucks investors affect individuals’ own 
preferences and behavior. We also find no evidence that Starbucks investors have more positive 
earnings expectations or assessments of reporting or earnings quality for Starbucks, on average.  
A unique feature of our empirical approach is that we can draw inferences from real-
world purchase data without compromising the most critical benefit of experimentation—random 
assignment. Although random assignment is likely to rule out most confounds that would be 
present in a non-experimental setting (e.g., reverse causality), the out-of-laboratory setting does 
trade off some control over the experimental stimulus to improve the external validity of the 
findings. For instance, participants are subject to actual stock price changes of the invested-in 
companies as they happen, so investment returns are not equivalent across experimental 
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conditions. Further, although we do not explicitly tell participants that their investment positions 
delineate experimental conditions, participants are not blind to these conditions. Thus, we 
conduct several planned supplemental analyses to address the concern that the generally null 
findings are due to potential confounds rather than the absence of economically meaningful 
treatment effects. For instance, we examine the possibility that differences in discretionary 
income due to differences in stock returns could account for the similar preferences for Starbucks 
products across investor groups. We also examine the possibility that participants feel a sense of 
competition with classmates invested in other stocks, which would be difficult to generalize 
beyond the experimental setting. Finally, we examine the effect of potential selection biases, 
given that some (albeit very few) participants begin but fail to complete the online survey. None 
of our tests suggest that any of these issues meaningfully affect the results.   
 Our study contributes in several ways. Whereas prior work emphasizes the monitoring 
benefits of large financial intermediaries on company performance, we examine a variety of 
potential benefits of direct, individual ownership. This examination is important given that the 
benefits of direct ownership in the aggregate could improve firm performance, particularly to the 
extent investors influence others to adopt their preferences and behaviors. While the results of 
our registered analyses do not support the hypothesis that small amounts of stock ownership 
cause the average investor’s purchase decisions and other views and preferences to become more 
favorable to the company, our planned supplemental analyses suggest that the treatment effects 
are stronger for investors who do not need to dramatically alter their behavior to benefit the 
company. For instance, the treatment effects are stronger when there is a better “match” between 
firm and owner—e.g., for owners of Starbucks who tend to spend relatively more money at 
coffee shops. These findings suggest that characteristics of the firm’s individual investors are 
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important determinants of the magnitude of the benefits direct ownership provides the firm. 
More broadly, our findings build on prior evidence that increases in a company’s ownership base 
are associated with stock price increases (e.g., Amihud, Mendelson, and Uno [1999], Lehavy and 
Sloan [2008]) and shed light on the potential motivations for stock splits, employee stock 
purchase programs, and other efforts to make shares more affordable to retail investors, 
particularly for consumer products companies.  
 By examining the effects of stock ownership on investors’ behavior and preferences, our 
study also adds to the growing literature in accounting that examines the effects of investment 
position on individuals’ judgments and decisions (e.g., Elliott, Rennekamp, and White [2016], 
Fanning, Agoglia, and Piercy [2015], Hales [2007], Seybert and Bloomfield [2009], Thayer 
[2011]). Using laboratory-based designs, these papers provide evidence that stock ownership can 
result in biased expectations for future earnings and risk, ceteris paribus. Results from our 
planned supplemental analyses complement this prior work. Specifically, because our 
participants hold stock for several months (instead of for several minutes), our results highlight 
the potential existence of variables that could moderate the effects previously documented in the 
laboratory.  
2. Registered Hypothesis Development 
Prior research suggests that individual investors do not base their investment decisions 
solely on expected returns and risk (e.g., Aspara and Tikkanen [2011, 2010], Fama and French 
[2007], Keloharju et al. [2012], MacGregor et al. [2000]). For example, investors buy the stock 
of companies they know and like and avoid buying the stock of companies with corporate values 
that conflict with their own self-concepts (e.g., people who see themselves as eco-friendly tend 
to avoid buying stock in oil companies). Whether the theoretical relations work in the opposite 
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direction—whether investment induces psychological biases or changes inputs to investors’ 
utility such that they make different decisions that impact the company—remains an outstanding 
empirical question. In the following sections, we propose a number of reasons stock ownership 
could alter individuals’ behavior in ways that benefit the invested-in company. 
2.1 THE BELIEF-IN-INFLUENCE EXPLANATION 
First, an investor might make decisions in an effort to influence the company’s stock 
price (and, therefore, her investment value). It is not necessary for an individual’s behavior to 
actually affect the company’s stock price for this process to explain a change in behavior—it is 
only necessary that an individual believe an effect is possible. This potential explanation is 
predicated on individuals’ tendency to believe they can influence outcomes they demonstrably 
cannot (Langer [1975]) and to exaggerate the likelihood of small probability events (e.g., Fox 
and Tversky [1998], Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, and Combs [1978]). For example, 
Feddersen [2004] concludes that prior findings on rational choice theory in political science 
suggest that “voters participate because they hope to influence the ultimate outcome of the 
election,” even when the probability that a single individual’s vote can change the outcome of 
the election is extremely small.3  
2.2 THE AFFECT EXPLANATION 
Second, stock ownership could intensify an individual’s positive feelings for a company, 
which can alter how she makes decisions that concern the company (e.g., whether to purchase a 
company’s products (Li and Petrick [2008])). For instance, stock ownership likely causes an 
individual to identify more closely with the company (Tajfel and Turner [1986]). Because 
individuals are motivated to hold positive views of themselves and their associations, greater                                                         
3 For example, the probability of a voter affecting the outcome of a close national election in the US is roughly one 
in ten million (Gelman, King, and Boscardin [1998]). 
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identification can breed additional company-specific affect (Greenwald and Banaji [1995]). In 
addition, assuming an investor gathers additional information about the invested-in company 
(e.g., via social media feeds or company disclosures), the investment should increase the 
investor’s familiarity with the company. Increased familiarity should breed additional positive 
affect, ceteris paribus (Moreland and Zajonc [1982], Zajonc [1980]). Because individuals tend to 
rely on affective feelings when making important judgments and decisions (Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, and MacGregor [2007]), it follows that stock ownership is likely to increase investors’ 
company-specific affect, and, in turn, alter their behaviors that impact the company.4  
2.3 THE COGNITIVE DISSONANCE EXPLANATION 
Third, stock ownership could trigger feelings of cognitive dissonance when the investor 
considers taking actions that do not support the invested-in company. Festinger [1957] defines 
cognitive dissonance as the discomfort individuals feel when they hold multiple simultaneous 
cognitions or beliefs that are in conflict. For example, an individual experiences cognitive 
dissonance when she acts in a way that is inconsistent with her beliefs about how she should act. 
To the extent investors believe they should support the invested-in company, investors would 
experience cognitive dissonance when taking actions that do not support the company despite the 
existence of available alternatives that would (e.g., when buying coffee from a competitor 
instead of from Starbucks).  
Investors can alter either their cognitions or their behaviors to reduce the dissonance they 
experience (Festinger [1957], Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, and Wheatley [1998]). For 
                                                        
4 We expect investment position to drive any observed difference in affect between treatment and control groups, 
which should, in turn, drive any observed differences in behavior across conditions. However, it is also possible that 
an investment position causes an investor to change her behaviors in ways that breed additional company-specific 
affect (e.g., the investor purchases more of the company’s products, and the act of purchasing products increases 
affect for the company). Given the proximate cause for the change in affect would be the exogenous investment, we 
do not view this possibility as an alternative explanation for differences in our dependent measures between groups.  
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example, an investor could reduce dissonance by telling herself that she is only one person and 
her choices could not meaningfully impact a company’s performance. Alternatively, the same 
investor could reduce dissonance by making an effort to avoid purchasing substitute products 
from the company’s competitors. The results of prior research suggest that, for decisions viewed 
as reversible, individuals tend to favor behavioral changes over cognition changes (Gilbert and 
Ebert [2002]). We posit that, prior to making a decision that could affect the invested-in 
company, investors are likely to think about the cognitive dissonance they would feel should they 
choose an action that does not benefit that company—i.e., company-relevant decisions should be 
seen as reversible ex ante. Consequently, we expect investors to manage their behavior such that 
they avoid experiencing cognitive dissonance.5  
2.4 REGISTERED HYPOTHESES 
We expect any attempt to influence the value of an investment position, any heightened 
affect for the invested-in company, or any dynamic avoidance of cognitive dissonance to affect 
investors’ behaviors in ways that benefit the company. Our primary hypotheses, both stated in 
alternative form: 
H1: A small investment in a company’s stock causes investors to purchase more of the 
company’s products.  
 
H2: A small investment in a company’s stock causes investors to hold regulatory views  
more closely aligned with the financial interests of the company.  
3. Registered Empirical Design 
3.1 GENERAL PROCEDURES  
Graduate business students enrolled in introductory financial accounting classes at three 
separate universities form our sample of individual investors. Relying on graduate business                                                         
5 If, instead, investors reduce their feelings of cognitive dissonance by altering their beliefs, we would expect to 
observe no effect of investment on behavior via heightened anticipated feelings of cognitive dissonance.  
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students ensures that all participants at a given university have similar access to Starbucks 
locations and roughly comparable time constraints, characteristics that should reduce statistical 
noise in the analyses. Further, the experimental task is neither complex nor requires pre-existing 
finance or accounting knowledge, implying that the participants are a good match for the task 
(Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy, and Pronk [2007], Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson [2002]).  
Despite the additional complexity that comes with recruiting participants from multiple 
universities, we believe this element of the design is critical for two reasons. First, using multiple 
universities reduces some of the risk inherent in any non-laboratory experiment. For example, it 
could be that some unpredictable event disrupts our ability to collect data at one of the 
universities. While certain institutional characteristics differ across the universities, we do not 
believe this is a shortcoming of the design, as we standardize all non-indicator variables within 
each university before pooling the observations across universities. Second, relying on only one 
university would limit our sample size and therefore the statistical power of our tests.6 
We collect data by conducting a between-participants experiment in which we randomly 
assign ownership in Starbucks or in one of three control companies.7 We use Starbucks as the 
treatment company to maintain consistency in our measures and because Starbucks stores are 
ubiquitous and familiar. We use three control companies to minimize participants’ sense of 
competition with their classmates. As discussed further below, we use 3M, Microsoft, and 
                                                        
6 Ex ante, we use pilot data to estimate the sample size needed to detect a treatment effect of practical importance 
with reasonable power. For example, given α = 0.10 (one-tailed) and 1 – β = 0.80 (Tabachnick and Fidell [2007]), 
we require a sample size of approximately 90 participants to detect a treatment effect of $30 in Starbucks purchases. 
Soliciting participants from multiple universities increases the chances we obtain this minimum sample size. 
7 For the two universities that utilize student workgroups, we randomly assign stock ownership based on students’ 
membership in these groups, which are constructed by the university’s graduate business program office before 
classes begin. These workgroups comprise 5-6 students each and constitute the teams for group work throughout the 
academic term. The primary reason for assigning ownership based on workgroup membership is that we believe it 
improves the power of the tests. If workgroups were to include both Starbucks and control company investors, then 
the predicted treatment effects could be attenuated, as Starbucks investors’ behavior and preferences would be more 
likely to affect control company investors’ behavior and preferences (the design’s counterfactual).   
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Procter & Gamble as the control companies because these companies are sufficiently dissimilar 
to Starbucks, so as to avoid exacerbating or “washing out” treatment effects.  
At the beginning of the academic term, the course instructor at each university introduces 
the study in class. Within this introduction, instructors announce that each participant will be 
given a $20 investment in a publicly traded company as part of an investment project and that 
students should expect a follow-up email after the class period for additional details. This email 
informs students that, in exchange for participating, they will receive the market value of their 
initial $20 investment as of a pre-determined date in the following academic term.8 Thus, 
participants ultimately receive more or less than $20, depending on the assigned company’s 
stock price performance during the investment period. The purpose of this compensation 
structure is to maximize the generalizability of our findings to real-world investors.  
Students opt in to the investment project by clicking on a hyperlink within the body of the 
email, which brings them to a webpage. After the student inputs a few pieces of information 
(e.g., preferred name and email address), the webpage displays the stock the student has been 
assigned. By having students opt in to receive the investment, we filter out students who are least 
incentivized by the compensation—that is, those for whom $20 is a weak incentive—and 
therefore least likely to complete the survey at the end of the term. Removing these students 
from the sample before they know their specific investment eliminates the possibility that their 
non-responses could be attributed to the experimental manipulation ex post, which would present 
selection concerns.9 In addition to displaying the name of the stock to which the student is                                                         
8 To ensure participants’ product purchase behavior is at least capable of influencing Starbucks’ stock price 
performance, we design the investment period to extend beyond Starbucks’ next two quarterly earnings 
announcements (approximately four to five months from the investment date). Another reason for designing the 
investment period to extend into the next academic term is to ensure the experimental treatment is still present when 
participants complete the online survey instrument at the end of the academic term. 
9 Having students opt in has three additional benefits. First, choosing to invest should instill in participants a greater 
sense of ownership of their investment position. Second, the act of opting in psychologically commits participants to 
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assigned, the webpage lists the names of all four companies included in the study. By identifying 
the four companies, we ensure that any unintentional endorsement of the company whose stock 
participants receive is constant across experimental conditions. If participants were to only view 
the company they are assigned, any perceived endorsement of that company could provide an 
alternative explanation for positive findings.  
After opting in, participants receive individualized monthly emails updating them on the 
current value of their investments. These emails mimic the statements investors commonly 
receive from traditional brokerage firms. At the end of the academic term, participants receive a 
survey request via email. Because completed survey data are necessary to measure product 
purchase behavior, we maximize the response rate to the survey by offering respondents entry 
into a drawing for one of 30 $50 Amazon.com gift cards and by following up with participants 
who do not respond. At the conclusion of the investment period, we pay participants the current 
market value of their respective investments inclusive of dividends during the investment period.  
3.2 DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
3.2.1 Product Purchase Measures. At the end of the academic term (approximately three 
months into the investment period), participants complete an online survey. As the final 
component of this survey, participants provide information about their Starbucks purchases over 
the purchase period.10 Critically, participants are not aware of our intent to collect product 
purchase data until after spending behavior has been determined and after they answer all 
questions designed to inform our potential explanations. This element is a significant strength of                                                                                                                                                                                   
complete our survey instrument at the end of the academic term. Third, clicking on the link in the email ensures that 
all participants in our final sample have attended to the experimental stimulus. 
10 In a pilot study, 70 graduate business students at one of the three universities reported that they purchase 
Starbucks products seven times per month, on average (responses ranged from ‘0’ to ‘15+’ times per month). 
Product purchase behavior that is both relatively frequent and variable across students supports the use of Starbucks 
as our treatment company for the product purchase measures and graduate business students as our participant pool. 
Note that no treatment (i.e., investment) was present in this pilot study. 
 13 
our research design as it means that demand effects are unlikely to provide an explanation for our 
results. We are also careful to select control companies that do not directly compete with 
Starbucks to avoid a potential product substitution effect. If the control group were to comprise 
investors in another food and beverage company (e.g., McDonald’s), any observed difference 
between conditions could either be a result of Starbucks investors spending more at Starbucks 
because they own Starbucks stock or control company investors spending less at Starbucks 
because they are spending more at McDonald’s.  
To maximize the accuracy of the purchase data, we instruct participants who use credit or 
debit cards at Starbucks locations to access their accounts online to retrieve their purchase 
information. Online bank accounts typically allow users to easily export transaction data over a 
specified time period. Participants can then clean the data of any sensitive identifiers and 
eliminate information related to non-Starbucks purchases before uploading the file to the survey 
website. Participants who use a Starbucks card or the Starbucks App can allow us to retrieve 
their transaction history directly from Starbucks by providing us permission to do so and their 
Starbucks card number. Participants who prefer not to upload a file or prefer not to provide us 
with the requested information can instead use a template to self-report their purchases. Because 
participants’ recall for cash purchases is likely noisy and potentially biased, we do not ask for 
this information.11  
In addition to gathering data on participants’ own product purchase decisions, we capture 
participants’ preference to spend money that is not their own at Starbucks. To collect these data, 
the graduate program office at each university (with the relevant course instructor’s help) solicits                                                         
11 Pilot (actual) participants report that when purchasing Starbucks products they use a credit/debit card, a registered 
Starbucks card, and cash/other form of payment, 68 (65), 20 (17), and 12 (18) percent of the time, respectively, on 
average. Further, pilot participants report purchasing Starbucks products at Starbucks locations 75% of the time, on 
average, implying that these purchases should be observable via participants’ credit/debit card and Starbucks card 
data. Overall, these results provided some assurance that our product purchase data are relatively complete. 
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students’ preferences for the products served at an upcoming event via an in-class poll 
approximately halfway through the academic term. Within the poll, students indicate whether 
they would prefer the program office to purchase and serve coffee and other beverages from 
Starbucks or from either of two competitors. The poll also includes another question about food 
preferences, which we do not use in this study. The poll is not anonymous, as we can only use 
data from students who opt in to our study and because we must link each vote to a particular 
individual’s online survey responses.12 Later in the academic term, the graduate program office 
at each university facilitates an event in which they serve the beverage and food items that 
receive the most votes. 
3.2.2 Regulatory Alignment Measure. At the beginning of our online survey, participants 
indicate how likely it is they would vote for a hypothetical statewide increase in the minimum 
wage to $15 per hour. A number of cities and states have considered minimum wage increases to 
$15 per hour—a feature that enhances the generalizability of our findings.13 We inform 
participants that the minimum wage increase is most likely to affect businesses that currently pay 
a significant number of employees less than $15 per hour. We state that opponents of a $15 per 
hour minimum wage argue that increasing the minimum wage generally hurts the profitability 
and value of these businesses (e.g., Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen [2011]). We also note that 
proponents of a $15 per hour minimum wage generally argue that the increase is fair and 
necessary to keep low-income families above the poverty line. We intentionally choose control 
companies that are less likely than Starbucks to pay employees below $15 per hour and are 
                                                        
12 Once our data collection efforts are complete, we strip any identifying information from our data set. That is, our 
final data set only distinguishes observations via anonymous observation numbers. 
13 Prior opinions on minimum wage increases could be strong relative to any treatment effect. Consistent with the 
idea that an investment in Starbucks could influence participants’ views, only 11% of pilot participants indicate 
being 0% Likely to vote for a $15 per hour statewide minimum wage (i.e., the treatment could reduce the likelihood 
of voting for the measure for 89% of pilot participants). 
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therefore less likely to be negatively affected by this regulatory measure.14 This design choice 
lowers the likelihood that any treatment effect would be “washed out” due to control company 
investors also becoming less likely to support a minimum wage increase.  
3.3 OTHER PREFERENCES AND PERCEPTIONS  
 Consistent with prior research, it is possible that stock ownership affects preferences and 
perceptions beyond those related to product purchases or regulatory matters (e.g., Hales [2007]). 
To provide evidence on these potential effects, we ask several additional questions within the 
online survey. We ask participants to gauge their confidence that Starbucks’ financial statements 
accurately represent Starbucks’ financial performance and position; how likely they believe it is 
that Starbucks will exceed market expectations when it reports earnings the following month; 
and to what extent they believe Starbucks’ financial reporting choices are consistent over time, a 
measure intended to capture perceptions of earnings quality (Dichev, Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal [2013]). By measuring investors’ perceptions after holding stock for several months, 
we provide evidence on how real-world complexities influence relations previously documented 
in the laboratory.15  
3.4 PROCESS QUESTIONS AND ADDITIONAL MEASURES 
 Within the survey instrument, participants also answer questions relevant to explaining 
any observed differences in our dependent variables across investor groups. Specifically, 
                                                        
14 Results from our pilot study support our choice. On average, pilot participants tend towards agreement with the 
statement “If passed, I believe this bill is likely to negatively impact Starbucks’ financial performance” (p = 0.03, 
two-tailed), but tend towards disagreement with the statement “If passed, I believe this bill is likely to negatively 
impact Microsoft’s financial performance” (p < 0.01, two-tailed).  
15 After our proposal was approved, we adjusted the survey to address the possibility that control company investors 
could become disinterested in the survey or believe the survey was not meant for them given its strict focus on 
Starbucks. In particular, we added a short description early in the survey informing participants that the survey 
includes questions about both the company they are invested in and another company. As a result, Starbucks 
investors answered questions about Starbucks followed by questions about a randomly selected control company, 
while control company investors answered questions about Starbucks followed by questions about the company they 
were invested in. 
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participants answer questions to indicate (1) their beliefs about whether their own behavior could 
matter for Starbucks’ stock price, (2) their general affect (feelings) towards Starbucks, and (3) 
their anticipated feelings of discomfort when choosing not to support Starbucks when presented 
with opportunities to do so.  
We ask participants several additional questions throughout the survey instrument. To 
ensure any observed difference in product purchase behavior is not driven by a sense of 
competition (e.g., that control company investors do not exhibit an anti-Starbucks mindset 
simply because they want their classmates to “lose”), we ask participants whether they viewed 
the investment project as a competition, and, if so, who or what they felt they were competing 
against. Because stock ownership could affect information gathering, we ask participants how 
often they accessed information about Starbucks. To provide evidence on the potential for word-
of-mouth effects, we ask participants to approximate how many times a month they talked about 
Starbucks to people outside of their graduate program and to rate the tone of these comments. 
We also ask how frequently they met friends, family, and colleagues at Starbucks locations 
during the academic term.  
Finally, we ask about various individual characteristics important for supplemental 
analyses. To measure social connectedness, we ask participants to name the three classmates 
with whom they spend the most non-classwork-related time and to estimate how many hours a 
week they spend meeting with members of their workgroups, if applicable. We also ask 
questions about participants’ coffee and tea drinking habits and solicit participants’ prior 
investing experience, the number of individual stocks that participants are currently invested in, 
and whether participants owned Starbucks stock in a personal investment account at the 
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beginning of the investment period. To conclude the survey, participants provide some additional 
demographic information and submit their product purchase data (as described above). 
4. Planned Analyses and Related Results 
4.1 SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 We start with 403 possible participants, the total number of entering graduate business 
students across the three universities. Of these, 280 students voluntarily opt in to the study at the 
beginning of the academic term; 136 are randomly assigned ownership in Starbucks and 144 are 
randomly assigned ownership in one of the three control companies. Approximately 96% (269 / 
280) of participants begin and 89% (250 / 280) of participants ultimately complete the online 
survey.16 We use all data available for each analysis; however, for all analyses, we only include 
participants who indicate they did not own stock in Starbucks as of the investment date.17 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the final sample and defines all variables used in 
the following analyses. None of the primary dependent variables appear to suffer from obvious 
floor or ceiling effects, and we find that the demographic characteristics of the participants 
roughly match those of most graduate business programs: 65% of participants are male, the 
median age is 28, and 59% are US Nationals.  
< TABLE 1 > 
4.2 MANIPULATION CHECK 
 To assess the effectiveness of the investment manipulation, we ask participants to 
identify the company they were given an investment in at the beginning of the academic term. 
All participants correctly answered this manipulation check.  
                                                        
16 There is no significant difference between the expected and observed proportions of Starbucks investors who 
complete the online survey in its entirety (49% (136 / 280) vs. 48% (119 / 250); χ2 = 0.09; p = 0.76). 
17 This criterion reduces our final sample size by approximately 3%.  
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4.3 PLANNED HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
4.3.1 Hypothesis 1 – Product Purchase Behavior. To test H1, we rely on participants’ 
submitted purchase data for the purchase period (OwnMoney) and participants’ preference for 
ordering Starbucks beverages—versus beverages from other popular chains—for a business 
school event (OthersMoney). OwnMoney is a continuous variable that takes only non-negative 
values.18 As for all other non-indicator variables in the analyses below, we standardize 
OwnMoney by university. That is, separately for each university, we transform the variable by 
subtracting the mean value and dividing by the standard deviation of participants’ total 
purchases. This transformation is necessary to account for university-specific factors (e.g., 
differing product prices, length of the academic term) that could cause clustering in each 
measure by university. OthersMoney is an indicator variable equal to one if the participant votes 
for Starbucks and zero otherwise.  
Because other variables that could potentially influence product purchase behavior should 
be randomized across investment conditions (e.g., discretionary income and coffee-drinking 
habits), we test H1 by conducting an independent samples t-test (chi-square test) to compare the 
mean of OwnMoney (OthersMoney) across investor groups. Panels A and B of Table 2 report the 
results of these planned hypothesis tests. The results are directionally consistent with H1 but do 
not exhibit a statistically significant difference between Starbucks and control company investors 
for either OwnMoney (p = 0.74) or OthersMoney (p = 0.81).19  
                                                        
18 We set OwnMoney to missing for participants who indicate using cash or unregistered gift cards more than 50% of 
the time when purchasing products at Starbucks locations. This restriction reduces our sample size for analyses 
using OwnMoney by approximately 6%. 
19 We conduct several robustness tests to examine the sensitivity of the null results for OwnMoney. Inferences are 
unchanged when we conduct the same analysis after log-transforming OwnMoney to account for right skewness or 
use a Tobit model. We also find that inferences are unchanged when we regress OwnMoney on Treatment, 
SelfReported (an indicator variable equal to one for self-reported data and zero otherwise), and the interaction of 
Treatment and SelfReported, to examine the sensitivity of the findings to the inclusion of self-reported data (i.e., 
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< TABLE 2 > 
4.3.2 Hypothesis 2 – Regulatory Alignment. To test H2, participants use a 101-point scale 
with endpoints 0% Likely and 100% Likely to indicate how likely it is they would vote for a $15 
per hour statewide minimum wage. Because the hypothetical bill is expected to harm Starbucks’ 
profitability if enacted, lower values on the scale correspond to greater regulatory alignment with 
Starbucks’ financial interests. Thus, we reverse code the scale such that higher levels of the 
dependent measure, RegulatoryAlignment, indicate greater regulatory alignment with Starbucks’ 
interests. As reported in Table 2, Panel C, although results of this planned hypothesis test are 
directionally consistent with H2, RegulatoryAlignment does not differ statistically across investor 
groups (p = 0.72).  
4.4 PLANNED ANALYSES OF PROCESS MEASURES  
 As discussed in Section 2, we expect several mechanisms could explain any observed 
effects of stock ownership on the dependent variables. However, given we cannot reject the null 
hypotheses based on the tests reported in Section 4.3, we omit all planned mediation analyses. 
Instead, we supplement our main findings with several comparisons of the process variables 
across investor groups.  
The process measures include Influence (Purchasing), Influence (Voting), Affect, 
Dissonance (Purchasing), and Dissonance (Voting). Influence (Purchasing) measures a 
participant’s agreement with the statement, “I believe my purchases of Starbucks products could 
matter for Starbucks’ stock price.” Influence (Voting) measures a participant’s agreement with 
the statement, “Given I can participate in the popular vote, I believe my vote could matter for 
whether this bill is passed.” Affect measures a participant’s general positive feelings towards                                                                                                                                                                                   
product purchase data that participants choose to manually input into the survey, as opposed to data participants 
upload as an exported file or data we obtain from Starbucks directly).  
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Starbucks.20 Dissonance (Purchasing) measures a participant’s agreement with the statement, “I 
would feel discomfort if I were to purchase products from a Starbucks competitor that I could 
purchase from Starbucks.” Dissonance (Voting) measures a participant’s agreement with the 
statement, “I would feel discomfort if I were to vote in favor of a political measure that would 
likely harm Starbucks’ financial performance.” Participants indicate their responses to the Affect 
measures using fully labeled five-point scales with endpoints Do Not Agree (1) and Completely 
Agree (5). Participants indicate their responses to the Influence and Dissonance measures using 
fully labeled seven-point scales with endpoints Strongly Disagree (1) and Strongly Agree (7). 
Table 3 reports the results of these planned analyses. In Panel A we examine the 
difference in the correlation between the primary dependent variables and the relevant measure 
of belief-in-influence across conditions. Although a belief that an individual’s behavior can 
affect Starbucks’ stock price should not vary based on stock assignment, this belief should be 
more relevant for Starbucks investors than it is for control company investors. For example, a 
belief that buying Starbucks products will affect Starbucks’ stock price should not influence 
control company investors’ Starbucks purchase behavior, given that a change in Starbucks’ stock 
price is irrelevant to control company investors’ payoff. Thus, for the belief-in-influence 
explanation to hold, the correlation between participants’ beliefs about their ability to influence 
Starbucks and each dependent variable should be stronger for Starbucks investors than for 
control company investors. The results do not suggest that there are statistically significant 
differences in these correlations across investor groups (all p > 0.21). 
                                                        
20 Specifically, participants communicate their agreement with three statements—“Starbucks is a company I have a 
good feeling about,” “Starbucks is a company I trust,” and “Starbucks is a company I admire and respect.” We find 
that responses to these statements are internally consistent (α = 0.92), so we average them together to create one 
variable, Affect. 
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Because our theory suggests that stock ownership could directly affect both affect and 
anticipated feelings of cognitive dissonance, in Panel B we compare the means of these process 
measures across investor groups. Results suggest that, relative to control company investors, 
Starbucks investors do not display greater affect for Starbucks nor do they anticipate greater 
dissonance when considering patronizing a Starbucks competitor (both p > 0.40).21,22 However, 
Starbucks investors do report anticipating greater discomfort than control company investors 
from voting for a measure that would harm Starbucks’ financial performance (p = 0.03), 
suggesting stock ownership does affect investors’ cognitions about political and regulatory 
matters.  
< TABLE 3 > 
4.5 PLANNED SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
4.5.1 Individual Characteristics as Potential Moderators. We examine several individual 
characteristics that plausibly moderate the relation between stock ownership and the dependent 
variables examined above: income, gender, age, whether the participant is a US National, the 
number of other investments the participant holds, and the number of times per week the 
participant reports purchasing coffee or tea.  
We estimate the following regressions to test for potential moderating factors: (1a)   𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = ϕ0 + ϕ1 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + ϕ2 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑇𝐹𝑇𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑖 + 
ϕ3 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑇𝐹𝑇𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀                                                         
21 Despite these null findings, Starbucks investors do report accessing information about Starbucks (e.g., via news 
articles, social media feeds, financial statement filings, press releases, etc.) more often than control company 
investors (p = 0.06, untabulated). This result provides evidence that participants actively responded to the 
experimental stimulus. 
22 In untabulated analyses, we also find that an individual’s affect for Starbucks, but not her anticipated feelings of 
cognitive dissonance, is positively associated with OwnMoney (p = 0.01). In addition, we find that Starbucks 
investors tend strongly towards disagreement with the idea that they experience discomfort when purchasing 
products from a Starbucks competitor that they could have purchased from Starbucks (p < 0.01). Collectively, these 
results are consistent with the theory discussed in Section 2.3 inasmuch as greater affect should lead to greater 
patronage but an individual can manage cognitive dissonance by either altering her behavior or by altering her 
beliefs (Festinger [1957], Gilbert et al. [1998]). 
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 (1b)   𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = ω0 + ω1 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + �ω𝑖+16
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∗ 𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑇𝐹𝑇𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀 
 
where FirmBenefit is OwnMoney, OthersMoney, or RegulatoryAlignment, Treatment is as 
defined above, and Characteristici corresponds to a single individual characteristic. Note that i 
indexes the six proposed characteristics, implying that Equation (1a) is run separately for each 
characteristic.  
Table 4 presents the results of these planned supplemental analyses. Most of the 
interactions are statistically insignificant. However, we do find that the interaction of Treatment 
and CoffeeTeaDrinks in Panel A is positive and significant (p = 0.03), suggesting that the effect 
of the treatment on OwnMoney is greater among individuals who report purchasing more coffee- 
or tea-related beverages. Untabulated results suggest this moderating effect is driven by 
participants who report purchasing the highest levels of coffee and tea and is economically 
significant: the effect of the treatment on OwnMoney is approximately $17 greater for a one 
standard deviation increase in CoffeeTeaDrinks.23 This finding reinforces the simple intuition 
that stock ownership is more effective among individuals who can substitute away from a 
competitor in favor of the firm, rather than among individuals who would need to begin 
purchasing a type of product when they would otherwise not do so.  
In Table 4, Panel C we also find evidence that both age and nationality moderate the 
effect of stock ownership on RegulatoryAlignment. Specifically, we find that the effect of stock 
                                                        
23 However, we note that the moderating effect does not appear to be linear, as the most avid coffee and tea 
purchasers drive this result. For example, we find that this cross-sectional effect becomes statistically insignificant if 
we exclude from the sample those participants for whom CoffeeTeaDrinks is in 95th percentile (i.e., those who 
purchase ten or more coffee- or tea-related beverages per week).  
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ownership on RegulatoryAlignment is greater for older individuals and for US Nationals (both p 
< 0.08), subgroups that are more likely to vote on political and regulatory matters in the US. 
Untabulated results show that the effect of the treatment on RegulatoryAlignment is 
approximately 16 points greater if the participant is a US National and about seven points greater 
for a one standard deviation increase in Age. An unplanned follow-up analysis reveals that the 
simple t-test of RegulatoryAlignment across conditions is statistically significant when we 
restrict the sample to US Nationals (p = 0.09, N = 152, untabulated). Collectively, these findings 
suggest that while stock ownership may not have a strong influence on the average individual’s 
purchasing behavior or regulatory preferences, the effects of ownership have intuitively stronger 
effects for certain subgroups of individuals. 
< TABLE 4 > 
4.5.2 The Effect of Social Connections. Prior evidence suggests that decision-relevant 
information is circulated by word-of-mouth and individuals learn behaviors by observing the 
behaviors of others (Banerjee [1992], Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch [1992], Ellison and 
Fudenberg [1993, 1995]). Consistent with this evidence, we expect a social connection with an 
individual investor to influence behavior in ways that benefit the company, and for this influence 
to be incremental to the effects of ownership itself.  
To provide evidence on these effects, we estimate the following equations: (2𝑇)   𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = λ0 + λ1 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + λ2 ∗ 𝑊𝑊𝐹𝑊𝑊𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 
λ3 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝑊𝑊𝐹𝑊𝑊𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝜀 
 (2𝑏)   𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = ρ0 + ρ1 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + ρ2 ∗ 𝑆𝐹𝑇𝐹𝑏𝑊𝑎𝑊𝑡𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑡 + 
ρ3 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝑆𝐹𝑇𝐹𝑏𝑊𝑎𝑊𝑡𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
where FirmBenefit and Treatment are as defined above. WorkGroupTime equals the average 
number of hours per week the participant reports spending with workgroup members over the 
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course of the academic term, where applicable.24 Because stock is assigned to participants based 
on group membership for two universities, more time spent with group members is indicative of 
closer connections to Starbucks investors for other Starbucks investors and closer connections to 
control company investors for other control company investors. StarbucksLinks equals the 
number of Starbucks investors (out of a maximum of three) with whom the participant “spends 
the most non-classwork-related time.”  
Table 5, Panel A presents the results of these planned analyses. The coefficient on the 
interaction in Equation (2a), λ3, is not statistically significant for any of the three primary 
dependent variables (all p > 0.34). Thus, we cannot reject the null that the effects of stock 
ownership on Starbucks investors’ purchasing behavior and regulatory preferences are similar in 
the presence of reinforcing social connections. Similarly, neither ρ2 nor ρ3 are statistically 
significant in any of the three estimations of Equation (2b) (p > 0.18). Together, these results do 
not support the notion that individuals are more likely to behave in ways that benefit a particular 
company if they have a social connection with investors of that company. 
< TABLE 5 > 
Finally, we examine self-reported evidence of social network effects in Table 5, Panel B. 
As part of the online survey, participants estimate how many times a month they met friends, 
family, or colleagues at a Starbucks location during the academic term (NumberMeetings) and 
how many times a month they discussed Starbucks outside of class (FreqComments). 
Participants also rate the tone of their comments about Starbucks using a seven-point, fully-
labeled scale with endpoints Very Negative (-3) and Very Positive (+3) (ToneComments). 
Although these planned analyses do not provide evidence that Starbucks investors discuss                                                         
24 Due to the decision of one university’s graduate business program office to omit workgroups in the 2016-2017 
academic year, the sample size for this analysis is smaller than the sample size for the analyses reported above. We 
note that this university has the smallest graduate business school enrollment of the three. 
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Starbucks more frequently or more positively than control company investors (both p > 0.32), 
they do show that Starbucks investors report meeting friends, family, or colleagues at Starbucks 
locations more frequently than control company investors (p = 0.09). This result provides some 
evidence that stock ownership can cause an investor to gravitate towards visiting an invested-in 
company, but our previous results reflect that they do not spend significantly more of their own 
money during these visits.  
4.5.3 The Effect of Stock Ownership on Other Preferences and Perceptions. Prior 
laboratory-based studies suggest that stock ownership can affect investors’ perceptions of future 
cash flows and risk. In a similar spirit, we examine whether, relative to control company 
investors, Starbucks investors express greater confidence in the accuracy of Starbucks’ financial 
reporting (ReportingConfidence), are more likely to believe Starbucks makes consistent 
reporting choices (PerceivedConsistency), or have higher expectations for Starbucks’ earnings 
(EarningsBeatLikelihood). Participants respond to these three measures using 101-point scales 
with labeled endpoints (specific measures and labels are reported in Table 6). As reported in 
Table 6, there are no significant differences across conditions for any of these variables (all p > 
0.23). These findings are not in line with the robust relation between stock ownership and 
perceptions of future cash flows and risk previously documented in the laboratory (e.g., Hales 
[2007]). One potential explanation for our null findings is that participants have strong prior 
beliefs about Starbucks’ performance and financial reporting, so the incremental effect due to 
stock ownership is low and difficult to detect. It is also possible that other factors not captured in 
the laboratory setting moderate the relations previously documented. 
< TABLE 6 > 
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4.6 PLANNED ANALYSES TO ADDRESS POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS  
 Our empirical design relies on random assignment to rule out most confounds that would 
be present in a non-experimental setting, such as issues related to reverse causality and self-
selection. For example, the design ensures that our findings are not influenced by the tendency 
for investors to buy stock in companies they patronize. Moreover, we are able to randomize 
across conditions factors previously documented to be influential in investors’ perceptions and 
behavior (e.g., gender, investing experience, etc.). However, it is possible that there are 
alternative explanations for our findings, partly because the experimental design is neither 
laboratory-based nor restricted to a short experimental time frame. We briefly discuss some of 
these alternative explanations and their relation to our results. 
4.6.1 A Competition Effect. It is possible that a participant perceives her investment to be 
part of a competition and that this sense of competition influences her judgments and decisions. 
For example, a student invested in a control company could shift away from purchasing products 
from Starbucks if she seeks to (and believes she can) undermine other students’ investments, 
consistent with a sense of competition among classmates that is not easily generalizable beyond 
the experimental setting. It is also possible that students do the opposite. For example, control 
company investors could purchase more Starbucks products in an effort to help Starbucks 
investors. This behavior would bias against us finding results. 
We make several design decisions to minimize any sense of competition as a potential 
confounding factor. For instance, we inform students that there are four companies to which they 
may be assigned (hoping to disperse any feelings of direct competition), and we design the 
compensation structure so each participant’s payoff is increasing only in the invested-in 
company’s performance (removing any economic incentive to compete). We also measure as 
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part of the survey instrument whether students viewed the investment project as a competition, 
and we reexamine the results after excluding individuals who state that they viewed the project 
as a competition with other students in the class. These analyses produce inferentially identical 
results to those reported above.  
4.6.2 A Wealth Effect. Another possible alternative explanation is that differences across 
conditions in stock returns make participants in certain conditions feel richer than those in other 
conditions. For example, it is possible that the average Starbucks investor does not purchase 
more Starbucks products than the average control company investor because she feels poorer 
than the average control company investor. Ex post, this explanation is unlikely because the 
stock returns of Starbucks and the control companies are relatively similar over the purchase 
period; Starbucks returned approximately 1.4%, 3M -0.5%, Microsoft 8.7%, and P&G -3.3%. 
We also find that the difference in OwnMoney between Starbucks and control company investors 
is not significant when we restrict the pool of control company investors to any one of the three 
control companies.25  
4.6.3 Selection Concerns. As discussed in Section 4.1, not all participants who opt in to 
the study at the beginning of the academic term complete the online survey at the end of the 
term. Further, some participants begin the online survey but do not complete the last portion of it 
(related to Starbucks purchase data)—i.e., we observe some level of attrition.26 Although factors 
unrelated to the treatment that cause attrition should be randomized across conditions (e.g., 
                                                        
25 To provide further evidence on the effect of an investment’s performance on investors’ willingness to take actions 
that benefit the invested-in company, we also conduct an analysis that exploits time series variation in the dependent 
variable, OwnMoney, and Starbucks stock returns over the purchase period. Specifically, we test whether concurrent 
or trailing returns are differentially associated with product purchase behavior for Starbucks versus control company 
investors. Untabulated results do not support the notion that weekly Starbucks stock returns moderate the relation 
between Starbucks ownership and weekly Starbucks product purchases (p > 0.58).  
26 In addition to making every attempt to maximize our overall response rate, we also take steps to reduce attrition. 
For example, we provide instructions that minimize the time necessary to provide purchase data and we follow up 
with participants who begin but do not complete the entire survey. 
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concerns about privacy), unbalanced attrition rates between treatment and control investors 
could be indicative of underlying selection issues. For example, it could be that control company 
investors who make more Starbucks purchases are less willing to provide purchase data—a 
situation that would bias in favor of H1. This scenario is plausible if control company investors 
feel less motivated than Starbucks investors to provide purchase information and believe the 
effort required to report this information is increasing in the number of purchases made. 
To alleviate such selection concerns, we offer participants entry into a drawing for one of 
30 $50 Amazon.com gift cards in exchange for completing the survey, as noted above. Entry into 
the drawing is in addition to the right to receive the market value of their $20 investment and 
should provide participants with an incentive to complete the survey that is independent of their 
feelings about the companies or related stock price changes. We also designed the instructions to 
minimize any perceived relation between the effort required to provide purchase data and the 
amount of purchases made at Starbucks. The number of Starbucks purchases an individual makes 
over the purchase period should not substantially affect the effort it takes to export and filter 
credit card transaction history or to provide us with the information we need to collect the 
transaction data captured on a Starbucks card. Thus, even if control company investors are less 
motivated to provide information on their Starbucks purchases relative to Starbucks investors, 
participants’ propensity to complete the survey should not be strongly correlated with 
OwnMoney. In other words, any unbalanced attrition that results from lower motivation is 
unlikely to cause bias in our tests. 
Still, we recognize that unanticipated or unknown selection issues could affect the results. 
Ex post we expect these issues to be minor, as only 19 of the 269 participants who begin the 
online survey fail to complete it. Nonetheless, we implement Heckman’s [1976] two-step 
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estimator to attempt to correct for potential response bias related to OwnMoney. In the first stage, 
we estimate a probit model to predict participants’ decision to provide purchase data in the 
survey instrument. Explanatory variables for the decision to respond include basic demographic 
variables (including income, nationality, age, and gender), process measures (specifically, Affect 
and Dissonance), and the time it takes for the participant to complete preceding portions of the 
survey after starting the survey, which is intended to satisfy the exclusion restriction.27 In the 
second stage, we regress OwnMoney on Treatment and the inverse Mills ratio using OLS, 
correcting for heteroskedasticity (e.g., Bushway, Johnson, and Slocum [2007]). Our inferences 
are unchanged using this approach.28  
4.6.4 Issues of Statistical Power. Finally, it could be that our tests lack sufficient power to 
detect a treatment effect of practical importance. Given the observed distributions of our three 
primary dependent variables, the hypothesis tests reported in Section 4.3 should detect a 
treatment effect at the α = 0.10 (one-tailed) level of $19.90 in OwnMoney, of 16% in 
OthersMoney, and of nine points on the 101-point RegulatoryAlignment scale with power (1 – β) 
= 0.80. Overall, these analyses suggest that the levels of the treatment effects necessary to detect 
significant differences between conditions are reasonable (Tabachnick and Fidell [2007]).  
Nonetheless, we recognize there are a variety of potential determinants of the dependent 
variables we study, and controlling for some of these determinants could improve our ability to 
detect treatment effects that exist. Accordingly, we include control variables in a series of 
                                                        
27 Inferences are unchanged if we exclude purchases made after the date the online survey was first distributed from 
OwnMoney and include an additional variable in the first stage intended to satisfy the exclusion restriction—namely, 
the time it took for the participant to begin the survey after receiving the survey request.  
28 In our approved proposal, we proposed using another variable meant to satisfy the exclusion criteria—whether the 
participant begins the survey on a computer versus a mobile device. However, to maximize our response rate, we 
opted to explicitly direct individuals to complete the survey on a computer, which forced us to drop this variable.  
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multivariate robustness tests to improve the statistical power of the tests.29 Untabulated results 
show that controlling for these additional determinants substantially improves the explanatory 
power of the regressions. For example, including the controls for OwnMoney raises the R2 of the 
regression from 0.001 (when Treatment is the only explanatory variable) to roughly 0.20. 
However, the inclusion of these variables does not change our inferences for any of the three 
primary dependent variables.  
4.7 PLANNED BAYESIAN PARAMETER ESTIMATION  
We supplement our main findings with Bayesian data analysis techniques, which are of 
particular interest given our planned null hypothesis significance tests are inconclusive. Bayesian 
parameter estimation allows a Bayesian to (1) update her beliefs about the relative credibility of 
all candidate values of δ (where, for our purposes, δ represents the relation between stock 
ownership and a dependent variable), and (2) accept (not merely reject) a null hypothesis 
(Kruschke [2011]).  
A Bayesian begins with a belief about each possible value of δ—that is, a probability 
density function over the space of all possible δ—and revises these beliefs according to Bayes’ 
rule upon receiving additional information about δ. Because different readers likely hold 
different prior beliefs about the distribution of possible δ, we identify multiple prior distributions 
and present a posterior distribution for each prior. This community of priors includes both 
skeptical priors (normal distributions centered at δ = 0) and enthusiastic priors (e.g., for 
OwnMoney, normal distributions centered at δ = $40) to ensure we address the perspectives of a                                                         
29 For OwnMoney, controls include age, gender, income, nationality, whether the participant does or does not drink 
coffee or tea, the number of times per week the participant reports purchasing coffee or tea beverages, and whether 
the participant shares the credit or debit card that she uses to make purchases at Starbucks with another individual. 
For OthersMoney, controls include age, gender, income, nationality, and whether the participant does or does not 
drink coffee or tea. For RegulatoryAlignment, controls include age, gender, income, nationality, and political leaning 
(fiscally liberal to fiscally conservative). Untabulated tests show that none of these control variables have a 
statistically significant correlation with the randomly assigned treatment, as expected. 
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wide range of individuals (Kass and Greenhouse [1989], Speigelhalter, Freedman, and Parmar 
[1994]).30 We also pair each prior mean with two different variances, which correspond to low 
versus high confidence prior beliefs.  
Table 7 reports the results of these analyses. To aid interpretation, we calculate an 
interval (a < δ < b) that represents the most credible values of δ—the 95% highest posterior 
density (HPD) interval (Hoff [2009])—for each posterior distribution.31 The results show belief 
revision for each of the three dependent variables—slightly upward for skeptical priors and 
substantially downward for enthusiastic priors. For example, the enthusiastic, low confidence 
prior for OwnMoney corresponds to a mean posterior belief about the effect of the treatment on 
OwnMoney (δ) of roughly $22 (down from $40). Similarly, the variance of the posterior 
distribution is roughly half the variance of the prior distribution.  
< TABLE 7 > 
Because even values close to zero are effectively zero for practical purposes, the 
Bayesian can also establish a region of practical equivalence (ROPE) around δ = 0 (Kruschke 
[2011]). Whereas values outside of the ROPE are values of δ that she believes are economically 
meaningful, values within the ROPE are values of δ that she believes are equivalent to zero for 
practical purposes. The decision rule is then as follows: If the HPD interval lies entirely inside 
(outside) the Bayesian’s ROPE, then she accepts (rejects) the null hypothesis for practical 
purposes; else, she suspends judgment. For example, consider a Bayesian with a prior belief 
about the effect of an investment in Starbucks on Starbucks purchases (δ) that is normally 
                                                        
30 For interpretability, we do not standardize OwnMoney or RegulatoryAlignment in these analyses. Including 
university fixed effects does not meaningfully affect the results. 
31 The 95% HPD interval has two features: (1) the posterior probability of the HPD interval is 95% (i.e., the 
cumulative credibility of all δ in (a, b) is 95%), and (2) the minimum density of any point in the HPD interval is 
greater than or equal to the density of any point outside the interval (i.e., each value of δ in (a, b) is considered to be 
more credible than the most credible value outside (a, b)). 
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distributed with mean zero and variance 100. Assume also that this Bayesian believes that no less 
than a $20 change in money spent at Starbucks over the treatment period is economically 
meaningful. Because the 95% HPD given this prior (-10.99, 16.39) falls within the Bayesian’s 
ROPE (-20, 20) (see Table 7), she would accept the null hypothesis of no effect. We leave it to 
the reader to determine a meaningful ROPE and to use this ROPE to draw her own conclusions.  
5. Conclusion 
 In this study, which was pre-registered via the Journal of Accounting Research’s 
registration based editorial process, we examine the effects of public company stock ownership 
on individual investors’ product preferences, purchase decisions, and other views and 
preferences that could affect the company’s performance. In contrast to prior survey evidence, 
we find very little evidence that a small investment in a public company’s stock causes the 
average investor to change her product purchase behavior or regulatory preferences. Consistent 
with the generally null findings for our measures using frequentist statistics, Bayesian parameter 
estimation shows substantial downward belief revision for more optimistic ex ante expectations 
of the effects of stock ownership on the dependent variables for the average investor. 
In planned supplemental analysis, however, we do find evidence that the effects of 
Starbucks ownership on product purchases and on regulatory preferences are stronger for certain, 
intuitive subgroups of participants. Specifically, we find that the effect of ownership on purchase 
behavior is greater for participants who report purchasing more coffee- and tea-related 
beverages, and the effect of ownership on regulatory preferences is stronger for subgroups that 
are more likely to vote on US political and regulatory matters—namely, older participants and 
participants who are US Nationals. We also find that, relative to control company investors, 
Starbucks investors report experiencing greater discomfort voting for political measures that 
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would undermine Starbucks’ financial performance, suggesting that ownership has at least a 
marginal effect on cognitions about regulation. 
There are a number of avenues for future work to extend our study. As with any 
experiment, a potential concern is that the findings do not generalize to a more “real world” 
setting. For example, even though the opt-in process should screen out participants for whom the 
compensation is too low to be meaningful, it may be that graduate business students respond 
differently to stock ownership than other individual investors given that a $20 investment is 
smaller than the typical investment holding. It is also possible that the effects of ownership on 
purchase behavior and other preferences are different when the duration of ownership is longer 
or when the date of the sale of the stock is not predetermined. Further, it may be that the 
incremental, causal effects of stock ownership on behaviors that benefit the company are 
different when investors choose which stocks they own (i.e., when real-world investment self-
selection is incorporated into the design). Addressing these limitations with alternative research 
designs would be a fruitful avenue for future work.  
Future work could also build on our study in other ways. Evidence from the cross-
sectional tests suggest that the effects of ownership on investor behaviors depend on the 
relevance of the dependent variable to the investor. For example, we find that the effect of the 
$20 investment on product purchases is substantially greater for the most avid coffee and tea 
purchasers. These results raise the possibility that ownership assigned based on a company’s own 
screening mechanisms—rather than random assignment across a broad cross-section of 
individuals—has stronger relations to outcome variables of interest to the firm.32 Future work 
could also investigate the duration of the benefits of stock ownership, as investors who alter their                                                         
32 For example, Domino’s Pizza, Inc. recently began giving away ten free shares of its stock to randomly selected 
members of its loyalty program. See: http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/dominos-piece-of-the-pie-rewards-
program-just-became-more-rewarding-300372465.html. 
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behaviors or preferences in response to ownership may develop habits or preferences that benefit 
the company even after the investor no longer owns the stock. Further evidence on potential 
moderating effects could be informative as well, including evidence of the sensitivity of the 
effects to large stock price movements or highly publicized positive or negative news.   
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APPENDIX 
Deviations from our approved proposal 
 
Subsequent to approval of our proposal, we implemented two changes. We describe each change 
below:  
 
(1) After our proposal was approved, we adjusted our experimental instrument to address the 
possibility that control company investors could become disinterested in the survey or 
believe the survey was not meant for them given its strict focus on Starbucks. In 
particular, we added a short description early in the survey informing participants that the 
survey includes questions about both the company they are invested in and another 
company. As a result, Starbucks investors answered questions about Starbucks followed 
by questions about a randomly selected control company, while control company 
investors answered questions about Starbucks followed by questions about the company 
they were invested in. We note this deviation in footnote 15 of the registered report. 
 
(2) In our approved proposal, we proposed using three variables meant to satisfy the 
exclusion criteria for our Heckman two-step estimator: (1) the time it takes for 
participants to complete preceding portions of the survey after starting the survey, (2) the 
time it takes for participants to begin the survey after receiving the survey request, and 
(3) whether participants begin the survey on a computer versus a mobile device. 
However, to maximize our response rate, we opted to explicitly direct individuals to 
complete the survey on a computer, which forced us to drop this third variable. We note 
this deviation in footnote 28 of the registered report.  
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F I G U R E  1 
Timeline of experimental procedures 
 
Assign Stock 
Ownership 
(t = 0) 
       
 
Distribute 
Online 
Survey  
(tU1 ≈ 111  
tU2 ≈ 107 
tU3 ≈ 78) 
  
 
 
Cash Out  
Date 
(tU1 ≈ 158 
tU2 ≈ 153 
tU3 ≈ 125) 
                            
                  
 Purchase Period      
 Investment Period  
 
 
Investment Period: All experimental procedures occur during the investment period. The investment period is 
university-specific, as it starts at the beginning of the academic term for all participants. For all universities, the 
investment period ends on the same pre-specified date in the following academic term. Throughout the investment 
period, participants receive statements monthly to keep them up to date on how their investment is performing. 
 
 
Purchase Period: The purchase period lasts the length of the academic term. Participants make Starbucks product 
purchase decisions throughout the purchase period and communicate their preferred beverage supplier (Starbucks 
or one of two competitors) for a business school event via an in-class poll.   
 
Online Survey: At the end of the academic term, we distribute our primary survey instrument via email. 
Participants communicate the likelihood they would vote for a statewide minimum wage increase to $15 per hour, 
provide process measures, provide data on their Starbucks product purchases during the purchase period, and 
answer questions related to other preferences and perceptions. 
 
 Cash Out Date: We pay participants the market value of their investment plus any dividends.  
Figure 1 illustrates the timing of our registered experimental procedures. We run the experiment at three different universities 
(denoted “U1,” “U2,” and “U3”). Participants receive news of their $20 investment shortly after the beginning of the academic term 
on t (day) = 0, receive access to our primary survey instrument shortly after the end of the academic term on t ≈ 111 (U1), t ≈ 107 
(U2), or t ≈ 78 (U3), and receive the market value of their investment as of t ≈ 158 (U1), t ≈ 153 (U2), or t ≈ 125 (U3). Because 
participants have a two-week window to opt into the experiment, the exact lengths of the purchase and investment periods vary 
slightly by participant.  
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T A B L E  1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 25
th pctile Median 75th pctile Mean N obs 
Primary dependent variables      
OwnMoney 2.47 14.93 43.42 38.26 221 
OthersMoney 0 0 1 0.42 246 
RegulatoryAlignment 18 39 80 46.54 258 
      
Potential process variables      
Influence (Purchasing) 2 4 5 3.91 258 
Influence (Voting) 5 5 6 5.15 258 
Affect 2.67 3.33 4 3.33 258 
Dissonance (Purchasing) 1 2 4 2.61 258 
Dissonance (Voting) 2 3 5 3.61 258 
      
Potential moderating variables      
Income 1 2 4 2.76 258 
Female 0 0 1 0.35 258 
Age 26 28 31 28.82 257 
USNational  0 1 1 0.59 258 
NumberInvestments 0 0 2 2.23 258 
CoffeeTeaDrinks 1 3 5 3.68 258 
      
Social connections variables      
WorkGroupTime 6 11 20 14.26 219 
StarbucksLinks  0 1 2 1.20 258 
NumberMeetings 0 2 4 2.56 258 
FreqComments 2 3 5 4.97 258 
ToneComments 4 5 6 5.20 257 
      
Financial reporting variables      
ReportingConfidence 69 78 85 74.35 258 
PerceivedConsistency  60 71 80 69.75 258 
EarningsBeatLikelihood 50 60 71 59.59 258 
      
Other variables      
SelfReported 0 0 1 0.46 213 
CreditCardShare 0 0 0 0.17 242 
PoliticalLeaning -2 0 3 0.22 258 
CoffeeTeaYN 1 1 1 0.92 258 
Access 1 2 4 3.13 258 
 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics (25th percentile, median, 75th percentile, mean, and number of 
observations). The descriptive statistics for non-indicator variables are presented before standardization within 
university. OwnMoney is a continuous variable equal to the participant’s total reported purchases of Starbucks 
products. OthersMoney is an indicator variable equal to one if the participant votes for Starbucks beverages to 
be supplied at a business school event during the academic term and zero otherwise. RegulatoryAlignment is a 
continuous variable equal to 100 minus the participant’s reported likelihood of voting for a $15 per hour 
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statewide minimum wage (on a 101-point scale). Influence is a discrete variable ([1 to 7]) corresponding to a 
fully-labeled scale with endpoints Strongly Disagree and Strongly Agree for the statement, “I believe my 
purchases of Starbucks products could matter for Starbucks’ stock price” (Purchasing) or the statement, 
“Given I can participate in the popular vote, I believe my vote could matter for whether this bill is passed” 
(Voting). Affect is an average of three discrete variables ([1 to 5]) corresponding to a fully-labeled scale with 
endpoints Do Not Agree and Completely Agree for the statements, “Starbucks is a company I have a good 
feeling about,” “Starbucks is a company I trust,” and “Starbucks is a company I admire and respect.” 
Dissonance is a continuous variable ([1 to 7]) corresponding to a fully-labeled scale with endpoints Strongly 
Disagree and Strongly Agree for the statement, “I would feel discomfort if I were to purchase products from a 
Starbucks competitor that I could purchase from Starbucks” (Purchasing) or the statement, “I would feel 
discomfort if I were to vote in favor of a political measure that would likely harm Starbucks’ financial 
performance” (Voting). Income is a discrete variable ([1 to 6]) corresponding to responses $50,000 or less, 
Between $50,001 and $75,000, Between $75,001 and $100,000, Between $100,001 and $125,000, Between 
$125,001 and 150,000, or More than $150,000 for the question, “What was your annual household income 
prior to beginning your graduate program?” Female is an indicator variable equal to one if the participant is 
female and zero otherwise. Age is a continuous variable equal to the age of the participant. USNational is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the participant is a US National and zero otherwise. NumberInvestments is a 
discrete variable equal to the number of different companies the participant is invested in (not through a mutual 
fund or similar investment vehicle) at the end of the purchase period. CoffeeTeaDrinks is a continuous variable 
equal to the number of times per week the participant reports purchasing coffee- or tea-related beverages. 
WorkGroupTime is a continuous variable equal to the number of hours a week the participant spends meeting 
with members of her workgroup throughout the academic term. StarbucksLinks is a discrete variable ([0 to 3]) 
equal to the number of Starbucks investors (out of a maximum of three) in the graduate program with whom 
the participant spends the most non-classwork-related time. NumberMeetings is a continuous variable equal to 
the number of times a month the participant meets family, friends, or colleagues at a Starbucks location during 
the academic term. FreqComments is a continuous variable equal to the number of times a month the 
participant talked to individuals outside of class about Starbucks during the academic term. ToneComments is a 
discrete variable ([-3 to +3]) corresponding to a scale Very Negative to Very Positive for the question, “When 
you talk about Starbucks, what is typically the tone of your comments?” ReportingConfidence is a discrete 
variable ([0 to 100]) corresponding to a scale Not at All Confident to Very Confident for the question, “How 
confident are you that Starbucks’ financial statements accurately depict the financial performance and position 
of Starbucks?” PerceivedConsistency is a discrete variable ([0 to 100]) corresponding to a scale Not at All 
Consistent to Very Consistent for the question, “How consistent do you believe Starbucks’ financial reporting 
choices are over time?” EarningsBeatLikelihood is a discrete variable ([0 to 100]) corresponding to a scale Not 
at All Likely to Very Likely for the question, “How likely is it that Starbucks will exceed market expectations 
when it reports earnings next month?” SelfReported is an indicator variable equal to one if the participant self-
reports by manually inputting purchase data and zero otherwise. CreditCardShare is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the participant reports sharing a credit card that is used to make Starbucks purchases with 
another individual and zero otherwise. PoliticalLeaning is a discrete variable ([-5 to 5]) corresponding to a 
participant’s indication of their fiscal political preference (in general) on a scale from Fiscally Liberal to 
Fiscally Conservative. CoffeTeaYN is an indicator variable equal to one if the participant drinks coffee or tea 
and zero otherwise. Access is a continuous variable equal to the number of times a month the participant 
reports accessing information about Starbucks during the academic term (e.g., via news articles, social media 
feeds, financial statement filings, press releases, etc.). 
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T A B L E  2 
Comparisons across experimental conditions of OwnMoney, OthersMoney, and 
RegulatoryAlignment 
 
 
Panel A: OwnMoney 
 
 Starbucks 
investors (n) 
Control 
investors (n) 
Mean 
difference 
t-Statistic  
(p-Value) 
Mean 0.023 
(106) 
-0.022 
(115) 
0.045 0.34 
(0.737) 
 
 
 
Panel B: OthersMoney 
 
 Starbucks 
investors (n) 
Control 
investors (n) 
Mean 
difference 
Chi-squared  
(p-Value) 
Mean (%) 42.6% 
(122) 
41.1% 
(124) 
1.5% 0.06 
(0.812) 
     
 
 
Panel C: RegulatoryAlignment 
 
 Starbucks 
investors (n) 
Control 
investors (n) 
Mean 
difference 
t-Statistic 
(p-Value) 
Mean 0.022 
(127) 
-0.022 
(131) 
0.044 0.36 
(0.722) 
     
 
Table 2 presents the results of planned hypothesis tests that compare OwnMoney, OthersMoney, and 
RegulatoryAlignment across experimental conditions. Panel A presents the mean of OwnMoney by 
condition (Starbucks investors or control company investors) and shows the result of the independent 
samples t-test. Panel B presents the mean of OthersMoney by condition (Starbucks investors or control 
company investors) and shows the result of the chi-squared test. Panel C presents the mean of 
RegulatoryAlignment by condition (Starbucks investors or control company investors) and shows the result 
of the independent samples t-test. OwnMoney is a continuous variable equal to the participant’s total 
reported purchases of Starbucks products. OthersMoney is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
participant votes for Starbucks beverages to be supplied at a business school event during the academic 
term and zero otherwise. RegulatoryAlignment is a continuous variable equal to 100 minus the participant’s 
reported likelihood of voting for a $15 per hour statewide minimum wage (on a 101-point scale). 
OwnMoney and RegulatoryAlignment are standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 
one within each university. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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T A B L E  3 
Comparisons across experimental conditions of process variables 
 
 
Panel A: Influence 
 
 Correlation for 
Starbucks 
investors (n) 
Correlation for 
control 
investors (n) 
Difference t-Statistic  
(p-Value) 
OwnMoney and  
Influence (Purchasing) 
0.100 
(106) 
-0.067 
(115) 
0.167 1.24 
(0.215) 
     
OthersMoney and 
Influence (Purchasing)  
-0.039 
(122) 
0.071 
(124) 
-0.110 -0.87 
(0.387) 
     
RegulatoryAlignment and 
Influence (Voting)  
-0.174 
(127) 
-0.236 
(131) 
0.062 0.41 
(0.680) 
 
Panel B: Affect and Dissonance 
 
 Mean for 
Starbucks 
investors (n) 
Mean for 
control 
investors (n) 
Difference t-Statistic  
(p-Value) 
Affect  0.011 
(127) 
-0.010 
(131) 
0.021 0.17 
(0.867) 
     
Dissonance (Purchasing)  0.052 
(127) 
-0.051 
(131) 
0.103 0.83 
(0.406) 
     
Dissonance (Voting)  0.137 
(127) 
-0.133 
(131) 
0.270 2.19** 
(0.029) 
 
 
Table 3 presents the results of planned supplementary analyses that compare the proposed process 
variables, Influence (Purchasing), Influence (Voting), Affect, Dissonance (Purchasing), and Dissonance 
(Voting), across experimental conditions. Panel A presents the correlations between Influence (Purchasing) 
or Influence (Voting) and the corresponding dependent variables, OwnMoney, OthersMoney, and 
RegulatoryAlignment, by condition (Starbucks investors or control company investors), and presents the 
results of a statistical comparison of these correlations across conditions. Panel B presents the mean of 
Affect, Dissonance (Purchasing), and Dissonance (Voting) by condition (Starbucks investors or control 
company investors) and shows the results of the independent samples t-tests. OwnMoney is a continuous 
variable equal to the participant’s total reported purchases of Starbucks products. OthersMoney is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the participant votes for Starbucks beverages to be supplied at a business 
school event during the academic term and zero otherwise. RegulatoryAlignment is a continuous variable 
equal to 100 minus the participant’s reported likelihood of voting for a $15 per hour statewide minimum 
wage (on a 101-point scale). Influence is a discrete variable ([1 to 7]) corresponding to a fully-labeled scale 
with endpoints Strongly Disagree and Strongly Agree for the statement, “I believe my purchases of 
Starbucks products could matter for Starbucks’ stock price” (Purchasing) or the statement, “Given I can 
participate in the popular vote, I believe my vote could matter for whether this bill is passed” (Voting). 
Affect is an average of three discrete variables ([1 to 5]) corresponding to a fully-labeled scale with 
endpoints Do Not Agree and Completely Agree for the statements, “Starbucks is a company I have a good 
feeling about,” “Starbucks is a company I trust,” and “Starbucks is a company I admire and respect.” 
Dissonance is a continuous variable ([1 to 7]) corresponding to a fully-labeled scale with endpoints 
Strongly Disagree and Strongly Agree for the statement, “I would feel discomfort if I were to purchase 
products from a Starbucks competitor that I could purchase from Starbucks” (Purchasing) or the statement, 
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“I would feel discomfort if I were to vote in favor of a political measure that would likely harm Starbucks’ 
financial performance” (Voting). All non-indicator variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and 
standard deviation of one within each university. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the two-
tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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T A B L E  4 
Individual characteristics as potential moderators 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = ϕ0 + ϕ1 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + ϕ2 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑇𝐹𝑇𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑖 + ϕ3 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑇𝐹𝑇𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀 
  𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = ω0 + ω1 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + �ω𝑖+16
𝑖=1
∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑇𝐹𝑇𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑖 + �ω𝑖+76
𝑖=1
∗ 𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑇𝐹𝑇𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀 
 
 
Panel A: OwnMoney 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept -0.026 -0.146 -0.024 0.163 -0.023 -0.019 0.078 
 
(-0.28) (-1.33) (-0.26) (1.06) (-0.24) (-0.22) (0.50) 
Treatment 0.049 0.155 0.043 -0.001 0.046 0.073 -0.028 
 
(0.37) (0.95) (0.32) (-0.01) (0.34) (0.59) (-0.13) 
Income 0.127 
     
0.148 
 
(1.47) 
     
(1.59) 
Female 
 
0.421** 
    
0.394** 
  
(2.08) 
    
(2.14) 
Age 
  
0.168* 
   
0.117 
   
(1.73) 
   
(1.24) 
USNational 
   
-0.290 
  
-0.348* 
    
(-1.51) 
  
(-1.86) 
NumberInvestments 
    
0.010 
 
0.006 
     
(0.12) 
 
(0.08) 
CoffeeTeaDrinks 
     
0.270*** 0.250*** 
      
(3.08) (2.87) 
Treatment x Income -0.029 
     
0.010 
 
(-0.22) 
     
(0.07) 
Treatment x Female 
 
-0.384 
    
-0.306 
  
(-1.35) 
    
(-1.17) 
Treatment x Age 
  
-0.334** 
   
-0.247* 
   
(-2.39) 
   
(-1.81) 
Treatment x USNational 
   
0.058 
  
0.291 
    
(0.21) 
  
(1.10) 
Treatment x NumberInvestments 
    
-0.010 
 
-0.009 
     
(-0.07) 
 
(-0.07) 
Treatment x CoffeeTeaDrinks 
     
0.281** 0.288** 
      
(2.21) (2.25) 
N 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 
Adj R2 0.001 0.007 0.013 0.004 -0.013 0.163 0.189 
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Panel B: OthersMoney 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept -0.362** -0.588*** -0.382** 0.043 -0.362* -0.358* -0.127 
 
(-1.98) (-2.58) (-2.06) (0.15) (-1.96) (-1.96) (-0.36) 
Treatment 0.062 0.269 0.086 0.300 0.022 0.063 0.382 
 
(0.24) (0.83) (0.33) (0.74) (0.08) (0.24) (0.77) 
Income 0.083 
     
0.462** 
 
(0.49) 
     
(2.12) 
Female 
 
0.688* 
    
0.558 
  
(1.76) 
    
(1.35) 
Age 
  
-0.301 
   
-0.460** 
   
(-1.54) 
   
(-2.09) 
USNational 
   
-0.659* 
  
-0.743* 
    
(-1.75) 
  
(-1.75) 
NumberInvestments 
    
-0.329 
 
-0.363 
     
(-1.46) 
 
(-1.46) 
CoffeeTeaDrinks 
     
0.200 0.159 
      
(1.04) (0.74) 
Treatment x Income -0.153 
     
-0.275 
 
(-0.58) 
     
(-0.84) 
Treatment x Female 
 
-0.632 
    
-0.539 
  
(-1.16) 
    
(-0.92) 
Treatment x Age 
  
0.395 
   
0.507* 
   
(1.47) 
   
(1.67) 
Treatment x USNational 
   
-0.511 
  
-0.346 
    
(-0.95) 
  
(-0.59) 
Treatment x NumberInvestments 
    
-0.220 
 
-0.206 
     
(-0.61) 
 
(-0.52) 
Treatment x CoffeeTeaDrinks 
     
0.062 -0.025 
      
(0.23) (-0.08) 
N 246 246 245 246 246 246 245 
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.010 0.009 0.038 0.023 0.009 0.086 
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Panel C: RegulatoryAlignment 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept -0.024 0.075 -0.017 -0.181 -0.024 -0.021 -0.022 
 
(-0.28) (0.72) (-0.20) (-1.34) (-0.28) (-0.24) (-0.15) 
Treatment 0.052 0.081 0.043 -0.226 0.050 0.037 -0.217 
 
(0.43) (0.53) (0.35) (-1.21) (0.40) (0.30) (-1.01) 
Income 0.100 
     
0.127 
 
(1.24) 
     
(1.40) 
Female 
 
-0.310* 
    
-0.309* 
  
(-1.66) 
    
(-1.70) 
Age 
  
-0.116 
   
-0.170* 
   
(-1.33) 
   
(-1.93) 
USNational 
   
0.261 
  
0.158 
    
(1.51) 
  
(0.87) 
NumberInvestments 
    
0.066 
 
0.017 
     
(0.86) 
 
(0.22) 
CoffeeTeaDrinks 
     
-0.050 -0.026 
      
(-0.60) (-0.32) 
Treatment x Income 0.163 
     
0.068 
 
(1.31) 
     
(0.50) 
Treatment x Female 
 
-0.037 
    
0.063 
  
(-0.14) 
    
(0.25) 
Treatment x Age 
  
0.223* 
   
0.228* 
   
(1.78) 
   
(1.80) 
Treatment x USNational 
   
0.496** 
  
0.469* 
    
(2.04) 
  
(1.84) 
Treatment x NumberInvestments 
    
0.013 
 
-0.086 
     
(0.10) 
 
(-0.64) 
Treatment x CoffeeTeaDrinks 
     
-0.227* -0.181 
      
(-1.83) (-1.48) 
N 258 258 257 258 258 258 257 
Adj R2 0.024 0.014 0.001 0.068 -0.006 0.025 0.106 
 
 
Table 4 presents the results of planned supplementary analyses that examine variables that potentially moderate the relation between Treatment and OwnMoney 
(Panel A), between Treatment and OthersMoney (Panel B), and between Treatment and RegulatoryAlignment (Panel C). The analyses for OwnMoney and for 
RegulatoryAlignment, presented in Panels A and C, respectively, use OLS. The analysis for OthersMoney, presented in Panel B, uses a probit model. OwnMoney 
is a continuous variable equal to the participant’s total reported purchases of Starbucks products. OthersMoney is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
participant votes for Starbucks beverages to be supplied at a business school event during the academic term and zero otherwise. RegulatoryAlignment is a 
continuous variable equal to 100 minus the participant’s reported likelihood of voting for a $15 per hour statewide minimum wage (on a 101-point scale). 
Treatment is an indicator variable equal to one if the participant is assigned ownership in Starbucks and zero otherwise. Income is a discrete variable ([1 to 6]) 
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corresponding to responses $50,000 or less, Between $50,001 and $75,000, Between $75,001 and $100,000, Between $100,001 and $125,000, Between 
$125,001 and 150,000, or More than $150,000 for the question, “What was your annual household income prior to beginning your graduate program?” Female 
is an indicator variable equal to one if the participant is female and zero otherwise. Age is a continuous variable equal to the age of the participant. USNational is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the participant is a US National and zero otherwise. NumberInvestments is a discrete variable equal to the number of 
different companies the participant is invested in (not through a mutual fund or similar investment vehicle) at the end of the purchase period. CoffeeTeaDrinks is 
a continuous variable equal to the number of times per week the participant reports purchasing coffee or tea. All non-indicator variables are standardized to have 
a mean of zero and standard deviation of one within each university. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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T A B L E  5 
The effects of social connections 
 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = λ0 + λ1 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + λ2 ∗ 𝑊𝑊𝐹𝑊𝑊𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 
λ3 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝑊𝑊𝐹𝑊𝑊𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝜀 
 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = ρ0 + ρ1 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + ρ2 ∗ 𝑆𝐹𝑇𝐹𝑏𝑊𝑎𝑊𝑡𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑡 + 
ρ3 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝑆𝐹𝑇𝐹𝑏𝑊𝑎𝑊𝑡𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
 
Panel A: Field Measures of Social Connections 
 
 
OwnMoney OthersMoney RegulatoryAlignment 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.071 -0.024 -0.413** -0.340* 0.011 -0.033 
 
(-0.70) (-0.26) (-2.07) (-1.81) (0.12) (-0.37) 
Treatment 0.146 0.079 0.067 0.096 -0.026 0.051 
 
(1.00) (0.58) (0.24) (0.36) (-0.19) (0.40) 
WorkGroupTime 0.046 
 
0.344* 
 
-0.052 
 
 
(0.41) 
 
(1.66) 
 
(-0.53) 
 StarbucksLinks 
 
-0.014 
 
0.082 
 
-0.057 
  
(-0.14) 
 
(0.39) 
 
(-0.58) 
Treatment x WorkGroupTime 0.094 
 
-0.267 
 
0.109 
 
 
(0.62) 
 
(-0.95) 
 
(0.80) 
 Treatment x StarbucksLinks 
 
-0.183 
 
-0.347 
 
0.080 
  
(-1.34) 
 
(-1.26) 
 
(0.62) 
N 187 221 214 246 219 258 
Adj R2 0.001 0.009 
  
-0.011 -0.010 
Pseudo R2 
  
0.011 0.007 
  
 
 
 
Panel B: Self-Reported Measures of Social Connections 
 
 
 Starbucks 
investors (n) 
Control 
 investors (n) 
Mean 
difference 
t-Statistic  
(p-Value) 
NumberMeetings 0.107 
(127) 
-0.104 
(131) 
0.211 1.70* 
(0.090) 
     
FreqComments 0.062 
(127) 
-0.060 
(131) 
0.122 0.98 
(0.328) 
     
ToneComments 0.060 
(126) 
-0.057 
(131) 
0.117 0.94 
(0.347) 
 
 
Table 5 presents the results of planned supplementary analyses that examine the cross-sectional effects of 
social connections on OwnMoney, OthersMoney, and RegulatoryAlignment (Panel A) as well as statistical 
comparisons across experimental conditions of FreqComments, ToneComments, and NumberMeetings 
(Panel B). OwnMoney is a continuous variable equal to the participant’s total reported purchases of 
Starbucks products. OthersMoney is an indicator variable equal to one if the participant votes for Starbucks 
beverages to be supplied at a business school event during the academic term and zero otherwise. 
RegulatoryAlignment is a continuous variable equal to 100 minus the participant’s reported likelihood of 
voting for a $15 per hour statewide minimum wage (on a 101-point scale). Treatment is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the participant is assigned ownership in Starbucks and zero otherwise. 
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WorkGroupTime is a continuous variable equal to the number of hours a week the participant spends 
meeting with members of her workgroup throughout the academic term. StarbucksLinks is a discrete 
variable ([0 to 3]) equal to the number of Starbucks investors (out of a maximum of three) in their graduate 
program with whom the participant spends the most non-classwork-related time. NumberMeetings is a 
continuous variable equal to the number of times a month the participant meets family, friends, or 
colleagues at a Starbucks location during the academic term. FreqComments is a continuous variable equal 
to the number of times a month the participant talked to individuals outside of class about Starbucks during 
the academic term. ToneComments is a discrete variable ([-3 to +3]) corresponding to a scale Very Negative 
to Very Positive for the question, “When you talk about Starbucks, what is typically the tone of your 
comments?” All non-indicator variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 
one within each university. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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T A B L E  6 
Other investor preferences and perceptions 
 
 
 
 Starbucks 
investors (n) 
Control 
investors (n) 
Mean 
difference 
t-Statistic  
(p-Value) 
ReportingConfidence -0.075 
(127) 
0.073 
(131) 
-0.148 -1.20 
(0.233) 
     
PerceivedConsistency  -0.034 
(127) 
0.033 
(131) 
-0.068 -0.55 
(0.585) 
     
EarningsBeatLikelihood -0.014 
(127) 
0.014 
(131) 
-0.028 -0.23 
(0.820) 
 
 
Table 6 presents the results of planned supplementary analyses that compare ReportingConfidence, 
PerceivedConsistency, and EarningsBeatLikelihood across experimental conditions. ReportingConfidence 
is a discrete variable ([0 to 100]) corresponding to a scale Not at All Confident to Very Confident for the 
question, “How confident are you that Starbucks’ financial statements accurately depict the financial 
performance and position of Starbucks?” PerceivedConsistency is a discrete variable ([0 to 100]) 
corresponding to a scale Not at All Consistent to Very Consistent for the question, “How consistent do you 
believe Starbucks’ financial reporting choices are over time?” EarningsBeatLikelihood is a discrete 
variable ([0 to 100]) corresponding to a scale Not at All Likely to Very Likely for the question, “How likely 
is it that Starbucks will exceed market expectations when it reports earnings next month?” All non-
indicator variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one within each 
university. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  
 52 
 
T A B L E  7 
Bayesian analyses for OwnMoney, OthersMoney, and RegulatoryAlignment 
 
 
Panel A: OwnMoney 
 
 Prior 
mean 
Prior 
variance 
Posterior 
mean 
Posterior 
variance 
Posterior  
95% interval 
Enthusiastic, high confidence 40 10 36.49 8.62 30.72 – 42.34 
Enthusiastic, low confidence 40 100 21.70 47.28 8.18 – 35.14 
Skeptical, high confidence 0 10 0.39 8.85 -5.32 – 6.29 
Skeptical, low confidence 0 100 2.45 48.29 -10.99 – 16.39 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: OthersMoney 
 
 Prior 
mean 
Prior 
variance 
Posterior 
mean 
Posterior 
variance 
Posterior  
95% interval 
Enthusiastic, high confidence 0.2 0.01 0.180 0.0088 0.001 – 0.371 
Enthusiastic, low confidence 0.2 0.1 0.113 0.0403 -0.265 – 0.508 
Skeptical, high confidence 0 0.01 0.005 0.0091 -0.175 – 0.190 
Skeptical, low confidence 0 0.1 0.024 0.0388 -0.359 – 0.418 
      
 
 
Panel C: RegulatoryAlignment 
 
 Prior 
mean 
Prior 
variance 
Posterior 
mean 
Posterior 
variance 
Posterior  
95% interval 
Enthusiastic, high confidence 20 10 12.94 6.44 8.00 – 17.76 
Enthusiastic, low confidence 20 100 2.98 14.54 -4.59 – 10.49 
Skeptical, high confidence 0 10 0.01 6.43 -5.01 – 4.97 
Skeptical, low confidence 0 100 -0.01 15.66 -8.00 – 7.87 
      
 
Table 7 presents the results of planned Bayesian parameter estimation, a supplementary analysis, for each dependent 
variable (OwnMoney, OthersMoney, or RegulatoryAlignment). Each panel presents the parameters of various prior 
beliefs, the posterior beliefs after Bayesian updating, and the 95% highest posterior density interval. For Panels A 
and C, we assume an uninformative prior for the intercept, a normal likelihood function with an uninformative prior 
of the function’s variance, and a prior for the slope coefficient distributed normally. OwnMoney is a continuous 
variable equal to the participant’s total reported purchases of Starbucks products. OthersMoney is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the participant votes for Starbucks beverages to be supplied at a business school event during 
the academic term and zero otherwise. RegulatoryAlignment is a continuous variable equal to 100 minus the 
participant’s reported likelihood of voting for a $15 per hour statewide minimum wage (on a 101-point scale). 
OwnMoney and RegulatoryAlignment are not standardized for these analyses.  
 
 
